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Abstract
We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders
canoffertobothbuyandsellthesamecommodityinthe
exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a
buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market
mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such
exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be
incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the
market maker to suffer a signiﬁcant deﬁcit. Hence, to
combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech-
anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen-
tive compatible and also provides ﬂexible trade-offs be-
tween efﬁciency and deﬁcit.
Introduction
Exchange markets (aka double auctions) are the most impor-
tant institutions for modern economy, which are centralized
markets consisting of exchange rules for traders to buy and
sell commodities, e.g. stock exchanges. Most existing stud-
ies of exchanges are for the environments where a trader
is either a buyer or a seller, but not both, of certain com-
modities (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983; McAfee 1992;
Wurman, Walsh, and Wellman 1998; Blum, Sandholm, and
Zinkevich 2006; Bredin, Parkes, and Duong 2007; Parsons,
Rodriguez-Aguilar, and Klein 2011).
In this paper, we study another type of exchanges. We call
it dual-role exchange, where a trader offers to both buy and
sell of certain commodities but when she transacts, she can
be only a seller or a buyer, which is determined by the mar-
ket maker. There exist many real-world applications of dual-
role exchanges. For example, in ridesharing/carpooling (Ka-
mar and Horvitz 2009; Zhao et al. 2014), a driver would like
to sell his empty seats to riders at a reasonable price and may
also be willing to ride with other drivers (i.e., buy seats from
others) if the price they charge is lower than his driving cost.
Also, in electric vehicle (EV) charging (Kempton and Tomi
2005; Han, Han, and Sezaki 2010), an EV owner might buy
more electricity in order to ﬁnish a trip if the price is reason-
able, otherwise, she might sell the power stored in the car
and use other transportations instead. All these applications
share a common feature: an agent cannot be both buying
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and selling the same commodity at the same time, although
she be able to either buy or sell the same commodity. In
the ridesharing scenario, a commuter cannot drive and ride
at the same time, and in the EV charging scenario, an EV
cannot be charged and discharged at the same time. Another
important feature of these domains is that a trader do not de-
cide to buy or sell by herself if she is ﬂexible to either buy
or sell, which also gives us more opportunity to optimize so-
cial welfare. For example, in ridesharing, if every commuter
has to decide to either drive or ride before she participates
in the market, then if everyone decides to drive, we will end
up with no sharing. However, if every (or some) driver is
willing to ride with others, then we will be able to let some
drivers ride with others, which will then make the sharing
possible to save costs, reduce congestion and etc..
In designing an exchange mechanism, it is important to
achieve a number of desirable properties, namely: maxi-
mizing social welfare (i.e., efﬁcient), preventing manipu-
lations of agents (i.e., truthful), an agent never pays more
than what she gets (i.e., individually rational) and the mar-
ket maker should not run the mechanism with a deﬁcit (i.e.,
budget balanced). It is well known that designing an ex-
change mechanism that is efﬁcient, truthful, individually ra-
tional and budget balanced is impossible (Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite 1983). Since a loss-making mechanism does not
make economic sense in reality, we seek to ﬁnd budget bal-
anced mechanisms that can be applied in the real-world. In
order to achieve budget balance (i.e. removing deﬁcit), there
have been several attempts via trading efﬁciency (Parkes,
Kalagnanam, and Eso 2001; Babaioff and Walsh 2005). One
approach that stands out from classical exchange mecha-
nisms is McAfee’s trade reduction and its generalizations,
which are more relevant to this study (McAfee 1992; Gonen,
Gonen, and Pavlov 2007). The essential idea of McAfee’s
trade reduction is to reduce efﬁciency as little as possible
to get budget balanced, truthful, and individually rational
mechanisms.
Following McAfee’s approach, we design budget bal-
anced mechanisms for a dual-role exchange. We limit to the
situation where each trader buys or/and sells a single-unit
of a commodity. We ﬁrst show that McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion does not satisfy truthfulness in this type of exchange, al-
though it is truthful under a special setting, called marginally
decreasing valuation domain. We therefore propose a newtrade reduction to ﬁx the incentive problem of McAfee’s
trade reduction. However, this ﬁx might induce some deﬁcit.
In order to further control the deﬁcit, we generalize our pro-
posedreductionmechanismtoprovidetheﬂexibilitytotrade
off between efﬁciency and deﬁcit.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We ﬁrst intro-
duce the dual-role exchange model and the desirable proper-
ties for designing mechanisms for the model. Then we show
the performance (good and bad) of McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion in this model. Following that, we propose our new trade
reduction mechanism. Finally, we generalize the new mech-
anism for more ﬂexible deﬁcit control.
The Model
WeconsideranexchangewhereasetoftradersN exchange
one type of commodity. Each trader i 2 N has a valuation
vector (vb
i;vs
i) where vb
i  0 is i’s valuation for buying the
commodity and vs
i  0 is i’s valuation for selling the com-
modity. For example, in ridesharing, a driver with one empty
seat is willing to sell it for $2, and she is also willing to buy
one seat from other drivers for $3. Therefore, the driver’s
valuation is (3; 2). If trader i does not want or does not
have the commodity to sell, then vs
i =  1. If i does not
want to buy, then vb
i = 0. We say i’s valuation is marginally
decreasing if vb
i <  vs
i. In this setting, we consider that
no trader is allocated to sell and buy at the same time as
discussed in the introduction, otherwise the problem can be
solved as a classical exchange by splitting the trader into a
seller and a buyer. Let i denote the valuation of trader i, 
bethevaluationproﬁleofalltradersand i bethevaluation
proﬁle of all traders except i.
We study auction mechanisms requiring each trader to re-
port her valuation (not necessarily the truthful valuation) to
the mechanisms. In the rest of this paper, let i = (vb
i;vs
i)
indicate i’s true valuation and ^ i be i’s reported valua-
tion. A mechanism consists of an allocation  and a pay-
ment x. Given traders’ valuation report proﬁle ^ , allocation
i(^ ) 2 fbuyer;seller;unmatchedg denotes the transac-
tion of i: i receives one commodity if i(^ ) = buyer, gives
one commodity out if i(^ ) = seller, and does no trade if
i(^ ) = unmatched. xi(^ ) 2 R is the payment for trader i
and xi(^ ) < 0 means that i receives  xi(^ ) from the mech-
anism. An allocation  is feasible if the number of buyers is
the same as the number of sellers and the sellers’ selling val-
uation is not  1. Note that even if a trader’s buying valua-
tion is 0, she can still be allocated as a buyer (i.e. we assume
free disposal). In the rest of the paper, we only consider fea-
sible allocations. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne several key properties for
the mechanism to satisfy in the following.
Given traders’ valuation report proﬁle ^  and allocation ,
we deﬁne the valuation of i as:
v(i;i(^ )) =
8
> <
> :
vb
i if i(^ ) = buyer,
vs
i if i(^ ) = seller,
0 if i(^ ) = unmatched.
Note that the valuation here for holding some initial endow-
ment is zero and becomes negative if one sells it, which is
the same as if we have a positive valuation for holding the
initial endowment and becomes zero after one sells it.
Given an allocation, the sum of valuations of all traders
is referred to as the social welfare. We say an allocation is
efﬁcient if it maximizes the social welfare for any valuation
report proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 1. An allocation  is efﬁcient if for all , () 2
argmax02
P
i2N v(i;0
i()), where  is the set of all
feasible allocations.
Given traders’ valuation report proﬁle ^  and mechanism
(;x), the utility of i is quasilinear and is deﬁned as:
u(i; ^ ;(;x)) = v(i;i(^ ))   xi(^ ):
We say mechanism (;x) is individually rational if
u(i;(i; ^  i);(;x))  0 for all i 2 N, all i, and all
^  i, i.e. no trader will get negative utility via truthfully re-
porting no matter what others do. We say (;x) is truthful or
incentive compatible if i’s utility is maximized via truthfully
reporting, i.e. reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for
each trader.
Deﬁnition 2. A mechanism (;x) is truthful if
u(i;(i; ^  i);(;x))  u(i;(^ i; ^  i);(;x)) for all
i 2 N, all i, all ^ i, and all ^  i.
Lastly, we say mechanism (;x) is budget balanced if P
i2N xi(^ ) = 0 for all valuation report proﬁle ^ , or weakly
budget balanced if
P
i2N xi(^ )  0. If
P
i2N xi(^ ) < 0,
the mechanism runs a deﬁcit j
P
i2N xi(^ )j.
The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism is applicable in this model, which is efﬁcient, truthful,
individually rational but not budget balanced. In VCG, each
agent pays the harm he causes to others. Formally, given val-
uation report proﬁle  and efﬁcient allocation , the VCG
payment for trader i is deﬁned as:
x
vcg
i () = V ( i;)   V i(;) (1)
where
 V ( i;) =
P
j2Nnfig v(j;j( i)), i.e. the social
welfare for all traders, excluding i, of the efﬁcient allo-
cation without considering i’s report.
 V i(;) = V (;)   v(i;i()), i.e. the social wel-
fare for all traders, excluding i, of the efﬁcient allocation
considering all traders’ reports .
As Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed, it is im-
possible to design an exchange mechanism that is efﬁcient,
truthful and individually rational without outside subsidies.
Since a mechanism running a signiﬁcant deﬁcit is hardly ap-
plicable in real-world applications, we will search for mech-
anisms with deﬁcit control. There have been many attempts
to circumvent the impossibility by giving up efﬁciency
for budget balance under different settings (McAfee 1992;
Babaioff and Nisan 2001; Babaioff, Nisan, and Pavlov 2004;
Gonen, Gonen, and Pavlov 2007). In the next section, we
show that the well-known McAfee’s trade reduction mech-
anism cannot be applied in general in this model and there-
fore, we need to design new solutions for this model.McAfee’s Trade Reduction
In order to get budget balance, McAfee (1992) proposed a
truthful trade reduction mechanism for the setting where a
trader can either sell or buy, but not both. The idea is to re-
move the pair with the lowest buying and selling valuations
from the efﬁcient allocation, if necessary, to set up the pay-
ments to the other buyers and sellers. McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion can be extended to this model as follows:
McAfee’s trade reduction MMcAfee
1. Given traders’ valuation report proﬁle, compute the
efﬁcient allocation, and let vb
0;vs
0 be the lowest valu-
ations for buying and selling of all (matched) buyers
and sellers respectively (it is evident that vb
0   vs
0).
2. Let vb
 1;vs
 1 be the highest valuations for buying and
selling respectively of all unmatched traders and let
p =
v
b
 1 v
s
 1
2 .
3. If p 2 [ vs
0;vb
0], the payment for each buyer is p and
 p for each seller,
4. Otherwise, remove the buyer (seller) with buying
(selling) valuation vb
0 (vs
0), breaking ties indepen-
dently of their reports, and the payment for each re-
maining buyer is vb
0 and vs
0 for each remaining seller.
McAfee (1992) showed that MMcAfee is truthful, in-
dividually rational, and budget balanced in the classi-
cal exchange setting. Furthermore, the social welfare of
MMcAfee approaches to the optimal in the large market
limit, since it removes at most one pair of traders, who give
the lowest social welfare increase, from the efﬁcient alloca-
tion. However, we show in Theorem 1 that MMcAfee loses
the truthfulness property in our general setting.
Theorem 1. MMcAfee is not truthful.
Proof. The proof is by example. The following example
shows that MMcAfee is not truthful for a buyer that is able
to beneﬁt from switching to being a seller by misreporting.
 V CG McAfee xV CG xMcAfee
1: (9;0) s s  5:5  4
2: (7; 2:5) b b 4 6
3: (6; 6) b um 4 0
4: (2; 4) s um  5 0
5: (2; 5) um um 0 0
The above table shows the outcome of the VCG and
MMcAfee for 5 traders, where b stands for buyer, s stands
for seller and um stands for unmatched. Traders 3 and 4
are removed from the efﬁcient allocation by MMcAfee, and
the payment for trader 1 is  4 and 6 for trader 2.
If trader 2 reported a valuation (7;>  2), then she will be
allocated as a seller in MMcAfee (see the following table)
and receive 4 (with utility 1:5), which is better than being
allocated as a buyer with payment 6 (with utility 1).
 V CG McAfee xV CG xMcAfee
1: (9;0) b b   6
2: (7;>  2) s s    4
3: (6; 6) b um   0
4: (2; 4) s um   0
5: (2; 5) um um   0
Note that, trader 2 can also report (< 6:5; 2:5) to be allo-
cated as a seller.
As McAfee (1992) proved, MMcAfee is truthful if no
trader offers to buy and to sell at the same time. Therefore,
the incentive problem of MMcAfee is caused by the traders
who offer both buying and selling as we have seen in the
proof of Theorem 1. However, Theorem 2 shows that traders
are not incentivized to cheat in MMcAfee, if their valuations
are marginally decreasing, i.e. for all trader i, vb
i <  vs
i, al-
though they might offer both to buy and to sell.
 vs
bm > vb
bm  vs
sm > vb
sm


. . .
. . .
 vs
bi > vb
bi  vs
si > vb
si


. . .
. . .
 vs
b0 > vb
b0(vb
0)   vs
s0( vs
0) > vb
s0


vb
b 1   vs
s 1
Figure 1: Efﬁcient allocation example with marginally de-
creasing valuations for the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. MMcAfee is truthful if for all trader i, vb
i <
 vs
i, i.e., i’s valuation is marginally decreasing.
Proof. Given the efﬁcient allocation, let vb
0;vs
0 be the low-
est buying and selling valuations of all buyers and sellers
respectively (see Figure 1 for an example). We ﬁrst show
that a buyer (seller) in the efﬁcient allocation cannot misre-
port to be allocated as a seller (buyer) with positive utility in
MMcAfee.
Assume a buyer bi, in Figure 1, misreported to be allo-
cated as a seller, then the new efﬁcient allocation will add
more buyers or remove some sellers. Before bi switches, we
have that all unmatched traders’ buying valuations are  vb
0
because of the efﬁcient allocation, and all sellers’ buying
valuations are <  vs
0  vb
0 because of their marginally de-
creasing valuations and efﬁciency. If after bi switches, new
buyers are added, then bi’s payment as a seller is bounded
by the buyer with the lowest buying valuation, which is
>  vb
b0 > vs
bi. If after bi switches, some sellers are re-
moved, then the payment for bi as a seller is bounded by
the highest selling valuation of unmatched traders, which is
 vs
0 > vs
bi. Thus the utility for bi being a seller is negative.
Similarly, we can prove that a seller in the efﬁcient alloca-
tion cannot misreport to be allocated as a buyer with positive
utility in MMcAfee.Since no buyer/seller can gain anything by switching, the
only way that a buyer/seller can manipulate its report to
beneﬁt in MMcAfee is to lower her buying/selling valua-
tion to reduce her payment. However, McAfee (1992) al-
ready proved that a buyer/seller cannot gain anything by de-
creasing her buying/selling valuation. Therefore, for an un-
matched trader, it is evident that if she misreported to be
allocated as a buyer/seller, she will pay more than her valu-
ation.
The Balanced Trade Reduction
As discussed in the last section, McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion might not be truthful unless all traders’ valuation is
marginallydecreasing.Moreover,inreal-worldapplications,
the buying price is not necessarily smaller than the sell-
ing price (i.e. not marginally decreasing). For instance, in
ridesharing, a driver would sell an empty seat with a very
low price if the costs of adding one more person in her car
is very small, and she is also willing to pay as much as her
driving costs, which can be very high, to buy a seat to ride.
In this section, we propose a new trade reduction mecha-
nism to handle the situation where not all traders’ valuations
are marginally decreasing. The new mechanism deﬁnes ev-
ery trader’s payments by adding same amount to the VCG
payments such that buyers will pay more and sellers receive
less compared to VCG. The intuition behind our mechanism
is that VCG maximizes every trader’s utility and if we in-
crease a trader’s VCG payments by the same amount inde-
pendently of her valuation report, we will prevent her from
switching between the buyer and seller sides (i.e. truthful)
as well as reduce deﬁcit.
Before we describe the new mechanism, let us ﬁrst in-
troduce the general payment setting used in the mecha-
nism, which deﬁnes every trader’s payment via increasing
the VCG payments until they reach some thresholds.
Balanced payment setting x(v
b;v
s)
Given vb and vs the two thresholds for the payment in-
crease (vb for buying and vs for selling),
1. For trader i, let x
vcg
i and ^ x
vcg
i be the VCG payments
for i being a buyer and a seller respectively in VCG,
which can be calculated by assuming i’s report is
(1; 1) and (0;0) respectively.
2. The payment for i being a buyer is
xb
i =
8
<
:
x
vcg
i if x
vcg
i  vb
or ^ x
vcg
i  vs,
min(vb;x
vcg
i + (vs   ^ x
vcg
i )) otherwise.
3. The payment for i being a seller is
xs
i =
8
<
:
^ x
vcg
i if x
vcg
i  vb
or ^ x
vcg
i  vs,
min(vs; ^ x
vcg
i + (vb   x
vcg
i )) otherwise.
x(v
b;v
s) does not increase the VCG payments if one of the
VCG payments is above the corresponding threshold, oth-
erwise, increases the VCG payments by the same amount
of min(vb   x
vcg
i ;vs   ^ x
vcg
i ). That is, the increments in a
trader’s VCG payments for being a buyer and a seller are
balanced and limited by the thresholds vb;vs, which is es-
sential to prevent a buyer/seller from switching to the other
side.
Given the above payment setting mechanism, we deﬁne
the new trade reduction mechanism which applies x(v
b;v
s)
by deﬁning the two thresholds for each trader and then uses
the payment for the allocation.
Balanced trade reduction Mbtr
1. Given the traders’ valuation report proﬁle , com-
pute the efﬁcient allocation e(), and let b0;s0 be
the buyer and the seller with the lowest buying and
selling valuations of all (matched) buyers and sell-
ers respectively (breaking ties independently of their
reports).
2. For each buyer i 6= b0 in e(), i is allocated as a
buyer and the payment is deﬁned by x(v
b;v
s) with the
parameters vb = vb
b0 and vs deﬁned as follows:
(
minj6=i;e
j( i;^ i)=seller vs
j if jfj : e
j( i; ^ i) = sellergj > 1,
1 otherwise.
(2)
where ^ i is any report of i s.t. e
i( i; ^ i) = seller.
3. For each seller i 6= s0 in e(), i is allocated as a
seller and the payment is deﬁned by x(v
b;v
s) with the
parameters vs = vs
s0 and vb deﬁned as follows:
(
minj6=i;e
j( i;^ i)=buyer vb
j if jfj : e
j( i; ^ i) = buyergj > 1,
1 otherwise.
(3)
where ^ i is any report of i s.t. e
i( i; ^ i) = buyer.
4. For each i 2 fb0;s0g, deﬁne i’s payments by x(v
b;v
s)
with the parameters
 vb deﬁned as Equation (3).
 vs deﬁned as Equation (2).
Then, b0 is allocated as

buyer if vb
b0 > xb
b0,
unmatched otherwise.
and s0 is allocated as

seller if vs
s0 > xs
s0,
unmatched otherwise.
5. All unmatched traders in e() are unmatched with
payment zero.
Let us ﬁrst discuss the key difference between MMcAfee
and Mbtr. For the sake of simplicity, Mbtr does not con-
sider the case where MMcAfee does not need to remove a
buyer and a seller from the efﬁcient allocation, i.e., when theFigure 2: Price setting example for a buyer in Mbtr
price given by unmatched traders does not violate individual
rationality, which can be easily included in Mbtr without
violating the following analysis.
From the deﬁnition of Mbtr, we have that given traders’
report proﬁle, a buyer (seller) allocated in MMcAfee is also
allocated as a buyer (seller) in Mbtr. That is, the efﬁciency
of Mbtr is at least that of MMcAfee, which approaches to
the optimal in the large market limit (McAfee 1992).
Proposition 1. Mbtr is as efﬁcient as MMcAfee.
For buyer i other than b0, i will pay vb
b0 in MMcAfee,
while in Mbtr, i’s payment might be  vb
b0 depending on
i’s payment setting for being allocated as a seller if i misre-
ported. For example, in Figure 2, x
vcg
i and ^ x
vcg
i are the VCG
payments for i being a buyer and a seller in VCG, and vb and
vs are the thresholds deﬁned in Mbtr for i (it is evident that
vb = vb
b0). If vb   x
vcg
i > vs   ^ x
vcg
i , then the payment for
i being a buyer in Mbtr is xb
i = x
vcg
i + (vs   ^ x
vcg
i ) < vb.
Because of this balanced payment setting, Mbtr guarantees
that a buyer (seller) i 62 fb0;s0g allocated in VCG is still
better off for being a buyer (seller) in Mbtr. The threshold
vb (vs) is 1, if the trader is the only buyer (seller) allocated,
otherwise is the lowest buying (selling) valuation of other
buyers (sellers).
It is worth mentioning that for a buyer/seller i allocated in
both MMcAfee and Mbtr, i’s payment in Mbtr can be also
bigger than her payment in MMcAfee, if the VCG payment
is already above the threshold, which does exist.
Unlike MMcAfee, Mbtr does not simply remove buyer
b0 and seller s0 from the efﬁcient allocation, because they
might be able to switch/misreport to trade on the other side
with a positive utility. See Figure 3 as an example, if we
completely removed b0 and s0 in Mbtr, trader 3, i.e. b0, with
true valuation (10; 3) is incentivized to misreport to trade
on the other side with a utility at least 1. In Theorem 3, we
formally show that Mbtr is truthful.
Theorem 3. Mbtr is truthful.
Proof. Since x(v
b;v
s) is based on the VCG payment, the
payment for each buyer/seller in Mbtr is at least the VCG
payment. Therefore, for all traders who are unmatched in
VCG, their utility is maximized when they are also un-
matched in Mbtr.
 V CG ^ btr xV CG xbtr
1: (11; 3) b b    
2: (8; 2) s s    
3: (10; 3) b um 6 0
4: (4; 4) s um    
5: (6; 7) um um    
6: (5; 6) um um    
 V CG ^ btr xV CG xbtr
1: (11; 3) b b    
2: (8; 2) s s    
3: (0; 3) s s  5   4
4: (4; 4) s um    
5: (6; 7) b b    
6: (5; 6) b um    
Figure 3: A buyer with the lowest buying valuation switches
to the other side with positive utility.
For all buyer i 6= b0, threshold vb = vb
b0  vb
i which
cannot be changed by i, as no matter what i reports, vb
b0 is
still the lowest buying valuation of other buyers, as soon as i
is allocated as a buyer. Similarly, we can show that vs is not
determined by i’s report as soon as i is allocated as a seller.
WeknowthattheVCGpaymentsx
vcg
i ; ^ x
vcg
i areindependent
of i’s report and vb
i  x
vcg
i  vs
i  ^ x
vcg
i . Thus, xb
i = x
vcg
i +
andxs
i = ^ x
vcg
i + areindependentofi’sreportandvb
i xb
i 
vs
i  xs
i, where   0. We can further show that vb
i  xb
i  0,
no matter x
vcg
i  vb or x
vcg
i < vb. Therefore, i’s utility is
maximized for being allocated as a buyer in Mbtr.
For buyer b0, threshold vb  vb
b0 is the second lowest
buying valuation of all buyers when i is not the only buyer
allocated in the efﬁcient allocation. Otherwise, vb = 1. In
both situations, b0 cannot change vb as soon as b0 is allo-
cated as a buyer. Also b0 can not change vs. Since vb  vb
b0,
payment xb
b0 might be greater than vb
b0. If xb
b0 > vb
b0, then
b0 is unmatched because 0 > vb
b0   xb
b0  vs
b0   xs
b0, oth-
erwise b0 is allocated as a buyer. Therefore, b0’s utility is
maximized in Mbtr.
Similarly, we can show that for all sellers in the efﬁcient
allocation, their utility is maximized in Mbtr.
Since Mbtr does not always remove b0;s0 from the ef-
ﬁcient allocation as MMcAfee does, it might end up with
that the numbers of buyers and sellers are not balanced. See
Figure 4 for the example from the proof of Theorem 1, if
we apply Mbtr, trader 2’s payment is reduced from 6 to 5
and trader 3 is reallocated as a buyer, which solves the in-
centive problem we had in MMcAfee, but also allocates an
additional buyer.
To handle the extra buyer/seller allocated by Mbtr, we
cannot simply choose an unmatched trader to ﬁx the unbal-
ance, because if we use the same payment policy for the
newly allocated trader as for other buyers/sellers, the trader
will receive a negative utility (i.e., violates individual ratio-
nality), and if the payment is too large for her, then others
might be incentivized to be unmatched (i.e., violates incen-
tive compatibility). Therefore, one simple solution is to as- McAfee btr xMcAfee xbtr
1: (9;0) s s  4  4
2: (7; 2:5) b b 6 5
3: (6; 6) um b 0 5
4: (2; 4) um um 0 0
5: (2; 5) um um 0 0
Figure 4: A running example for MMcAfee and Mbtr.
sume that the mechanism (market maker) has a backup, i.e.,
the mechanism is able to buy one unit and is also able to sell
one unit. The backup is only used for ﬁxing the unbalance
when necessary. In real-world applications, this assumption
is not hard to implement. For example, in ridesharing, the
mechanism can use taxi companies as backups, and they are
only called up if necessary. In electric vehicle charging, this
can be easily implemented by adding some capability for
storing the energy in the system.
Deﬁcit Control and the Generalization
Unlike MMcAfee, the payment increase in Mbtr is limited
by balancing traders’ utilities for being a buyer and a seller.
Although not every trader is capable of switching, we are not
able to use their valuations to decide the payment increase.
Therefore, even in the situation where no trader offers both
buying and selling or all traders’ valuations are marginally
decreasing, the outcomes of applying Mbtr and MMcAfee
are not the same. In general, Mbtr cannot guarantee budget
balance. At the same time, we need to consider the costs of
using the backup of the mechanism, e.g., the costs of using
taxis in ridesharing, which can be modelled as the mecha-
nism’s valuation for buying and selling. For the example in
Figure 4, if the mechanism’s selling valuation is   6, then
there is no deﬁcit for applying Mbtr.
In order to further reduce or completely remove deﬁcit,
we can further increase traders’ payments by pushing up the
thresholdsofthepaymentincrease,i.e.vb andvs inMbtr.In
this section, we propose a generalization of Mbtr, to further
increase the payments by using the k-th lowest buying and
selling valuations as the payment increase thresholds. We
call this generalization k-balanced trade reduction, where
k  1 is chosen independently of traders’ reports.
k-balanced trade reduction Mbtr;k
1. Given the traders’ valuation report proﬁle , compute
the efﬁcient allocation e().
2. For each buyer/seller i in e(), deﬁne i’s payments
by x(v
b;v
s) with the parameters
 vb deﬁned as follows:
(
min
k
j6=i;e
j( i;^ i)=seller vs
j if jfj : e
j( i; ^ i) = sellergj > k,
1 otherwise.
where ^ i is any report of i s.t. e
i( i; ^ i) =
seller, and min
kfg denotes the k-th lowest.
 vs deﬁned as follows:
(
min
k
j6=i;e
j( i;^ i)=seller vs
j if jfj : e
j( i; ^ i) = sellergj > k,
1 otherwise.
where ^ i is any report of i s.t. e
i( i; ^ i) =
seller.
Then, give i the allocation maximizing her utility.
Given Theorem 3, it is not hard to show that Mbtr;k is
truthful. Note that, to apply Mbtr;k, the system will need
k backups for buying and selling. As discussed in the last
section, backups (e.g., extra drivers) are usually available in
real-world applications. Depending on the costs of using the
backups,itisnotalwaysthecasethatthedeﬁcitgeneratedby
Mbtr;k1 is less than the deﬁcit generated by Mbtr;k2 if k1 >
k2. Moreover, it is easy to see the following proposition. In
the extreme case, for a sufﬁcient large k, we will have all
traders are unmatched which is obviously budget balanced.
It is challenging to pick a desirable k in general, because
k should be independent of traders’ reports. However, we
may be able to provide some guidelines for selecting k if we
know that traders’ valuations satisfy certain distributions.
Proposition 2. Given the traders’ valuation report proﬁle
, we can always ﬁnd a k  1 such that the outcome of
applying Mbtr;k

on  is budget balanced.
Lastly, in real-world applications, if we know some
traders can only buy or sell, then we do not need to con-
sider their ability of switching, which will further reduce
the deﬁcit. For instance, in ridesharing, for a commuter who
does not have a car, then it is clear that she is not able to sell
seats to others, i.e., we can increase her buying payment to
the threshold.
Conclusion
We studied a type of exchanges, called dual-role exchanges,
where a trader can offer to both buy and sell for one unit of a
commodity, and when she transacts in the allocation, she can
either buy or sell, but not both. Dual-role exchanges are very
different from more commonly studied exchanges where a
trader has to decide whether to buy or to sell before partici-
pating in the exchanges. In dual-role exchanges, the decision
is made by the mechanism instead of the traders (traders just
need to report their valuations for buying and selling). We
showed that designing budget balanced mechanisms in such
exchanges can be very challenging. Especially, we showed
that McAfee’s trade reduction mechanism, which performs
very well in classical exchanges, is not truthful in general
in dual-role exchanges. Therefore, we proposed a balanced
trade reduction based on VCG and McAfee’s trade reduc-
tion, which is truthful and as efﬁcient as McAfee’s trade
reduction, but not budget balanced. To further reduce the
deﬁcit, we generalize the balanced trade reduction to trade
off between efﬁciency and deﬁcit.
We note that, when computing the efﬁcient allocation in
the reduction mechanisms, since a trader might be able toboth buy and sell, we cannot directly apply the allocation
algorithm from McAfee’s original trade reduction which or-
ders traders’ reported valuations with respect to buying or
selling and matches them if buying prices are greater than
sellingprices.Inthismodel,wecanapplyanefﬁcientalloca-
tion based on maximum-weighted bipartite matching, which
starts with an empty allocation/matching and adds one pair
of unmatched traders giving the “maximum social welfare
increase” into the matching iteratively until the social wel-
fare cannot be increased. The allocation problem here is
slightly different from the classical bipartite matching, be-
cause it does not have clear bipartite sets of buyers and sell-
ers. Therefore, at this stage, it is not clear if we can apply
the well-known Hungarian algorithms for the allocation, if
so, then it can be solved in polynomial time.
It is also worth mentioning that the balanced trade re-
duction mechanisms are Groves mechanisms, where the
payment is set by adding certain value to each trader’s
VCG payment independently of the trader’s valuation re-
port. Given the modiﬁed VCG payments, the mechanisms
compute an allocation that maximises each trader’s utility
(which sometimes also lead to the unbalanced numbers of
buyers and sellers). Regarding the backups used in the pro-
posed mechanisms, we have tried to substitute unmatched
(or pre-selected) traders for backups, but these substitutions
violate either truthfulness or individual rationality with the
payments we deﬁned. However, we do have truthful, indi-
vidually rational and (weakly) budget-balanced mechanisms
that do not require backups. For example, a mechanism ﬁrst
separates all traders into two disjoint sets independently of
their reports: traders in one set can only be allocated as buy-
ers or unmatched and traders in the other set can only be
allocated as sellers or unmatched, and then applies, e.g.,
McAfee’s trade reduction mechanism. These kinds of mech-
anisms essentially shrink the allocation space via reducing
the dual-role exchange to a single-role exchange and there-
fore are also very inefﬁcient. We conjecture that there is
some impossibility for achieving such a mechanism with-
out backups, if some trader has the ability to switch between
the seller and buyer sides, i.e., a trader is allocated as a buyer
in one situation and as a seller in another situation with the
same report.
To apply the mechanisms to broader applications, in fu-
ture, we aim to investigate how our mechanisms can be ap-
plied to other domains. For example, in EV charging, ev-
ery EV requires/supplies different amounts of electricity. In
ridesharing, each trip consists of a set of route sections and
each commuter wants to sell/buy different bundles of sec-
tions. It would be also very interesting to extend the model
to dynamic settings, where traders come and leave at differ-
ent points in time (Blum, Sandholm, and Zinkevich 2006;
Parkes 2007).
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